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Jurisdiction in Longshoremen's Injuries
Richard E. Hendricks*
T HE DECISION in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen' that state
law does not apply to injuries occurring on navigable
waters, began a series of jurisdictional questions which continue
today. This decision initially deprived some 300,000 longshore-
men and harbor workers in dangerous occupations of a com-
pensation remedy, 2 but it paved the way for a federal statute
providing them with compensation coverage. 3 Longshoremen
and harbor workers are today protected under state or federal
law, depending on whether their injuries occur on land4 or
"upon navigable waters." 5 They may be eligible for coverage
under both federal and state law.
6
Early Development and Enactment
In the Jensen case, the dependents of a stevedore, who had
been fatally injured while working on a gangway extending
from vessel to dock, were denied a remedy under state law.
State law was in conflict, in this case, with the general maritime
law which constitutes part of federal law under Article III,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution.7 The employee's
work was maritime, the contract maritime, the injury maritime,
and the employee's rights and liabilities were in maritime juris-
diction." Allowance of state coverage would destroy the uni-
formity of maritime law which Article III, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution was intended to establish.9 The constitutional limits of
federal maritime authority were not spelled out in Jensen, nor
* B.A. in Political Science, Gettysburg College (Pennsylvania); Claims Ex-
aminer, U. S. Department of Labor; Second-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 244 U. S. 205 (1917).
2 Comment, the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act, 43 Yale
L. J. 640-7 (1934).
3 33 U. S. C. 901-950; Paone, Admiralty: Concurrent Federal and State
Workmen's Compensation Coverage for Amphibious Workers, 48 Cornell
L. Q. 534 (1963).
4 Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt, 259 U. S. 263 (1922); Swanson v.
Marra Bros., 328 U. S. 1 (1946); Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295
U. S. 647 (1937).
5 33 U. S. C. 903(a).
6 Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries, 317 U. S. 249 (1942); Cal-
!beck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U. S. 114 (1962).
7 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra n. 1 at 212; Huttenbrauch, Maritime
Personal Injury Cases-The Twilight Zone, 32 Ins. Counsel J. 92 (1965).
8 Huttenbrauch, op. cit. supra n. 7.
9 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra n. 1, at 215.
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did the case show how far state jurisdiction could extend; it
merely held that for workers on navigable waters, state law
could not apply.'0
This decision caused serious difficulties in application,"
and in its wake were several legislative attempts to provide state
coverage for the workers. These laws were held to be unconsti-
tutional. 12 Congress had the power to revise or amend maritime
law, and could enact a general employer liability law, but could
not delegate such power to the states. 13
The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act 14 was en-
acted pursuant to the judicial suggestion in Dawson,15 and was
sponsored by the International Longshore Association and the
unions. 16 Passage of this law prevented a case by case creation
of ad hoc exceptions to the Jensen decision, 17 and Section 903 (a)
of the Act codifies that decision's dividing line between state and
federal jurisdiction.'8 The Senate Judiciary Committee, con-
sidering the Act, noted that injuries in loading and unloading
are not covered unless they occur on the ship or between the
wharf and ship so as to bring them within maritime jurisdiction. 19
Clarification
After the Act became law, the dock worker knew he was
covered, but could not be sure of the law which applied. 20 In
any given day these workers may pass between jurisdictions be-
cause of the nature of their work.2 1 Questions of conflict cannot
be solved by the full faith and credit provisions, as one side has
pre-eminent federal maritime jurisdiction.2 2 The beginning of a
solution to this impasse was the development of the "twilight
zone" concept.23 The concept was exceedingly broad2 4 and de-
10 Paone, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 533-534.
11 Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 233 F. Supp. 496, 498 (S. D.
N. Y. 1964).
12 Act of October 6, 1917, C. 97, 40 Stat. 395, in Knickerbocker Ice v. Stew-
art, 253 U. S. 149 (1920); Act of June 10, 1922, C. 216, 42 Stat. 634, in
Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219 (1924).
13 Washington v. Dawson, supra n. 12; Huttenbrauch, op. cit. supra n. 7.
14 33 U. S. C. 901-950.
15 Comment, op. cit. supra n. 2.
16 Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F. 2d 640 (2d Cir. 1965).
17 Paone, op. cit. supra n. 3.
18 The Supreme Court, 1961 Term (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers
Compensation), 76 Harv. L. Rev. 95 (1962).
19 Michigan Mutual v. Arrien, supra n. 16.
20 Case Note, Has the Jensen Case been Jettisoned? 2 Stanford L. Rev.
536 (1950).
21 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 408 (3rd ed. 1965).
22 Ibid.
23 Davis v. Department of Labor, supra n. 6; The Supreme Court, 1961
Term, op. cit. supra n. 18.
24 Michigan Mutual v. Arrien, supra n. 11.
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signed to cover those workers in shadowy areas of doubt.25 It
evolved a "first come, first served" rule.20 When a state claim
was made, the traditional presumption of constitutionality was
to be invoked to sustain jurisdiction; the federal administrative
decision (when and if federal claim initiated) was to be ac-
corded administrative finality.27 When a claim was made first
under the Federal Act, an award could be upheld by reason of
the provision (33 U. S. C. 920 (a)) that jurisdiction is to be pre-
served in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary. 2s
The "twilight zone" concept was an attempt to solve the
hardship cases, 29 but it must first be shown that the employee
comes within the area of doubt as to jurisdictional status. Con-
gress made clear its purpose to permit state protection whenever
possible. 30 For example, federal law applies if a longshoreman
falls into the water and drowns when transferring cargo from
a barge to a ship.3 1 In such cases, the federal law is an exclusive
compensation remedy.32
The principle that certain fringe area waterfront workers
may be covered under both state and federal law was further
clarified, and the administration of maritime compensation law
much liberalized, 33 in Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co.34 The
appeals court denied coverage under federal law, because a
worker on an uncompleted vessel on navigable water could
validly be covered under state law.35 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, awarded federal compensation. Congress had invoked its
Constitutional power, when the Act was passed, so as to provide
compensation for all injuries sustained by employees on navi-
gable water, whether or not a particular injury might also have
been within the constitutional reach of a state law.30 The Act
was designed to insure that a compensation remedy existed for
all injuries on navigable waters, and to avoid uncertainty as to
the source-state or federal-of that remedy. 37 The federal law
25 Case Note, op. cit. supra n. 20.
26 Ibid.
27 The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, op. cit. supra n. 18.
28 Davis v. Department of Labor, supra n. 6.
29 Paone, op. cit. supra n. 3.
30 Davis v. Department of Labor, supra n. 6; U. S. Casualty Co. v. Taylor,
64 F. 2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1933); Travelers Insurance Co. v. McManigal, 139
F. 2d 949, 951 (4th Cir. 1944).
31 Noah v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 267 F. 2d 218 (5th Cir. 1959).
32 Reasonover, Workmen's Compensation-Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers Act.-"Twilight Zone," 34 Tulane L. Rev. 233.
33 Michigan Mutual v. Arrien, supra n. 11.
34 Calbeck v. Traveler's Ins. Co., supra n. 6.
35 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F. 2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
36 Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra n. 6, at 117.
37 Id. at 124.
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reached all those injuries as to which the Jensen decision 38 had
rendered questionable the availability of a state compensation
remedy. All such injuries were covered by federal law whether
or not state law might apply.39
The Calbeck decision implies a need for certainty in the
compensation coverage to longshoremen and harbor workers.40
Injured workers have an option when the injury occurs in for-
mer state law areas and in the "twilight zone," 41 and they may
elect to recover under federal or state law when it is difficult to
ascertain proper jurisdiction.42
Admiralty Extension to Land Injuries
The courts have been careful to recognize that some water-
front workers perform their daily chores in jobs overlapping state
and federal boundaries, and guidelines have been provided for
applying the federal Act to these cases. Equal care has been
taken to avoid extending federal jurisdiction in compensation
matters onto land. This resistance might seem inappropriate at
first blush, in view of the Admiralty Extension Act of 1948,4 3
which provides in part:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury,
to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or
consummated on land.
Construing the Extension Act in Revel v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 44 the courts pointed out that the legislative history
indicates it was not intended to affect remedies which may exist,
against other parties involved, by existing law in any appropriate
forum. The Extension Act did not extend federal compensation
law to an employee injured while working on a pier.45 By deny-
ing compensation in this case, the court re-affirmed the Norden-
holt principle 46 that the federal compensation law did not ex-
tend to injuries on land. The Extension Act of 1948 did not
amend the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act; indeed, it
made no reference to the field of compensation law. 4 7
38 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra n. 1.
39 Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., supra n. 6, at 126.
40 Michigan Mutual v. Arrien, supra n. 11.
41 The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, op. cit. supra n. 18.
42 Calbeck v. Travelers, supra n. 6.
43 46 U. S. C. 740, hereinafter referred to as the Extension Act.
44 162 F. Supp. 279 (E. D. Va. 1958); affd. 266 F. 2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959).
45 Ibid.
46 Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt, supra n. 4.
47 Revel v. American Export Lines, supra n. 44.
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In Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien,48 the Extension
Act was viewed by the district court as extending federal com-
pensation to injuries on land. It was recognized that the com-
pensation law was not expressly amended in 1948, but the court
felt that longshoremen were to be protected to the fullest pos-
sible extent. An award to a worker injured on a temporarily
fixed skid extending over navigable water was held sustainable
on the basis of the Extension Act.49 The award of federal com-
pensation was affirmed on other grounds on appeal.50 No de-
cision was made by the appeals court on whether the award was
sustainable by reason of the Extension Act.5 1
The argument that Section 903 (a) of the federal compensa-
tion law was amended by the Extension Act received favorable
treatment in Interlake S. S. Co. v. Nielsen.52 In what appears to
be dictum, the court stated that the Admiralty Extension Act
made it clear that admiralty jurisdiction could extend to dam-
age caused on land by maritime events.53 The trend in case law,
the Admiralty Extension Act, and the effect of Calbeck point to
expanding boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction toward land.54
This case is not authority for the proposition that a land injury
is compensable under the federal law.5 5 Interlake specifically
held that the situs of injury (the employee died when his car
landed upside down on a frozen lake after driving off the dock)
was clearly within admiralty jurisdiction, even though the im-
petus which propelled him onto the ice had a land-based origin.56
In Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, 57 a case which was
handled in the courts much like Michigan Mutual,58 the em-
ployee was working on a dock and became caught up with some
material. He was lifted from the dock by a ship-based boom. In
district court, it was urged that the Extension Act enlarged and
extended the federal compensation law. This argument was re-
jected, because the Extension Act was intended only to extend
maritime jurisdiction to a class of torts from which the federal
courts had heretofore been excluded. 59 The decision denying
48 Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, supra n. 11.
49 Id. at 502.
50 Michigan Mutual v. Arrien, supra n. 16.
51 Id. at 646.
52 338 F. 2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
53 Id. at 882.
54 Id. at 882, 883.
55 Johnson v. Traynor, 243 F. Supp. 184, 195 (D. Md. 1965).
56 Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen, supra n. 52; accord, Thomson v. Bassett, 36
F. Supp. 956 (W. D. Mich. 1940).
57 220 F. Supp. 881 (S. D. Ga. 1963).
58 Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, supra n. 11; n. 16.
59 Atlantic Stevedoring Co. v. O'Keeffe, supra n. 57.
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compensation was reversed on appeal; 00 however, the appeals
court made no decision as to the applicability of the Extension
Act. Compensation was awarded because the employee was off
the dock and upon navigable waters when injured; it is the
place where the injury occurs which determines jurisdiction."'
The most comprehensive discussion to date of the Extension
Act and its relation to federal compensation law is contained in
Johnson v. Traynor. 2 The injuries occurred on a pier, but fed-
eral compensation was claimed. It was urged, among other
things, that the Extension Act, by embracing within admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction certain shoreside injuries, had ex-
tended the federal Act to land injuries. 6 3 Compensation under
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act was denied, be-
cause the specific jurisdictional requirement of the Act-that in-
juries must occur on navigable waters to be compensable-had
not been repealed by the Extension Act. 4 The legislative history
strongly negates any Congressional intention to repeal or re-
enact Section 903 (a) of the Act; Congress merely extended tradi-
tional admiralty jurisdiction to include damage by a vessel on
land.6 5 The Extension Act does not strike down the distinction
previously made between land and water injuries, and to adapt
the phrase "upon navigable waters" to fit wharves, piers, and
the like would be to sanction judicial legislation.6 6 The courts
lack this authority. 7 It would be necessary for Congress to
amend the federal compensation law in order to recognize the
view that the Admiralty Extension Act expanded federal juris-
diction to land injuries.0 8
Conclusion
Since stepping into the field of maritime workmen's compen-
sation in 1917, the courts have held rather consistently that a
jurisdictional boundary can be drawn. There is little difficulty
today if the employee is injured on or in navigable water, or on
temporary devices over navigable water. The injuries are fed-
eral, whether or not state law might also apply. It is equally
clear that land injuries are solely within state competence. The
courts may from time to time evolve concepts such as the
60 O'Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354 F. 2d 48 (5th Cir. 1965).
61 Id. at 50.
62 Johnson v. Traynor, supra n. 55.
63 Ibid.
64 Id. at 197.
65 Id. at 192-193.
66 Id. at 191.
67 Kolbilkin v. Pillsbury, 103 F. 2d 667 (9th Cir. 1939); affd. 309 U. S. 619
(1940).
68 Johnson v. Traynor, supra n. 55, at 188.
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"twilight zone" to cover transient problems, but have not shown
any serious interest in applying the Admiralty Extension Act of
1948 to change the law.
Decisions in the last several years have been none too clear
with regard to the applicability of the Extension Act, however,
with some lower courts favorably inclined and others rejecting
any extension of federal jurisdiction. Reve 00 and Johnso 7J
contain the better reasoned statements, with the latter case hold-
ing out perhaps the ultimate suggestion-that only by amend-
ment could the Extension Act be validly applied to the field of
compensation law.
There has not been any decision by the Supreme Court as
to whether admiralty jurisdiction in compensation law extends to
land by reason of the Extension Act. With this in mind, we can
say that land injuries still belong under state law. However, "we
know by now that nothing written in this field is the last word.
All it can be is the latest word." 71
69 Revel v. American Export Lines, Inc., supra n. 44.
70 Johnson v. Traynor, supra n. 55.
71 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Calbeck, supra n. 35, at 60.
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